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Abstract  
 
The research was motivated by the need for Zimbabwe’s financial assistance to kick-start 
the recovery of its economy from the meltdown it has been for more than a decade. Since 
the formation of the government of national unity (GNU) on February 13, 2009, 
government of Zimbabwe’s (GoZ) begging bowl for US$8.3 billion financial assistance 
has been extensively preached to both southern African countries and the world over. 
This study presents a totally different financial avenue, Chiadzwa diamond. Using the 
two estimated monthly revenue sales of US$1 billion and US$1.2 billion from Chiadzwa 
diamond, the study argues that the country’s immediate financial requirements of at least 
US$8.3 billion can be wholly met with proceeds from this mine field only if the new 
unity government has a political will. Partial projections presented in this paper shows 
that, once diamond revenue sales are harnessed by the government for the benefit of the 
whole economy as opposed to the current situation where the few revenues are only 
benefiting few politicians and their relatives, the country’s GDP can jump from the 2008 
level of US$3.2 billion to at least US$16.7 billion starting 2009. The paper also suggested 
management frameworks that the GoZ can consider implementing in the management of 
Chiadzwa diamond.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
1. Introduction  
 
Then (1980 [independent from Britain]) 
 
Annual inflation was 11.8%, while month-on-month rate was -0.50%; the highest 
Zimbabwean dollar denomination was Z$20; the mostly widely used currency (in 
more than 95% of all transactions) was the Zimbabwean dollar; the official 
exchange rate was US$1: Z$0.6540; the parallel (black) market exchange rate 
was US$1:Z$0.6475; GDP growth rate was 10.7%; GDP per capita was US$ 
755; unemployment rate was less than 30%; life expectancy was 60 years; and the 
country was the bread basket of Africa. 
 
Now (2009 January [under the colonial power of hyperinflation]) 
 
Annual inflation is 489 000 000 000; while month-on-month underestimated 
‘official’ rate is above 231 million percent and the independent analysts’ rate is 
estimated to be 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent (that is 65 followed by 
107 zeros) (as of 30 January 2009); the highest Zimbabwean dollar denomination 
is Z$1001 trillion; the mostly widely used currencies are US dollar, South African 
rand, UK pound, Euro and Botswana Pula (99.99%); the official exchange rate is 
US$1: Z$4 million (as of 30 January 2009); UN exchange is US$1: Z$35 
quadrillion (or 35x109)  while the parallel (black) market exchange rate is 
US$1:Z$200 trillion (as of 30 January 2009) and RTGS’s exchange rate is at least 
US$1: Z$ 100 quadrillion (100 and 15 zeros) (as of 30 January 2009); GDP 
growth rate is -6.1%; GDP per capita is US$402;  unemployment rate is 94%; life 
expectancy is 36 years; and the country is the bread beggar of Africa. 
 
It is common knowledge that Zimbabwe as a nation has been (and is currently) in a state 
of complete meltdown in all its economic, social, political and legal facets of its systems 
since 2000 to date (2009). IMF (2009) allude to the fact that economic disruptions mainly 
as a result of chaotic hyperinflation and a significant deterioration in the country’s 
business environment has resulted in a whooping 14 percent decline in real GDP in 2008 
alone, over and above the 40 percent cumulative decline during the period covering 2000 
to 2007. Thus, for the 9 year period, 2000 to 2008, Zimbabwe’s real GDP has contract by 
more than half that is by more than 54 percent. The economy’s supply-side especially in 
providing basic needs have become non-existence to such an extent that country could 
not provide the five basic needs of food, clothing, water, housing and electricity, and 
health. Even the government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) pointed to the fact that: 
 
                                                 
1 This really means 1 000, 000,000,000,000,000,000,000, 000. That is 1 Octillion (i.e., 1 and 27 zeros), 
taking into account the 13 zeros Zimbabwe's central bank has lopped off since August 2006 (3 zeros were 
chopped off on August 1st 2006 and further 10 zeros were chopped off on August 1st 2008) as a means of 
trying to make the country's currency somewhat more manageable. 
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“At the epicentre of the (Zimbabwe) economic crisis, have been unprecedented 
levels of hyper-inflation, sustained period of negative Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rates, massive devaluation of the currency, low productive 
capacity, loss of jobs, food shortages, poverty, massive de-industrialization and 
general despondency” (GoZ, 2009).  
 
Table 1 presents the countries economic and social indicators since its independence in 
1980. As shown, the country enjoyed positive economic growth for nearly 18 years, with 
the exception of 1984 and 1992 due to severe drought in those years. This growth trend, 
however, changed for worse since 1999 until today as economic growth rates became 
continuously negative.  
 
Table 1: Zimbabwe’s economic performance (1980 – 2008)  
Year GDP GDP per capita Annual Inflation 
 US$ billions (current) % Growth US$ % 
1980 5.4 10.7 755 7 
1981 6.4 12.5 881 11.8 
1982 6.9 2.6 902 16.8 
1983 6.2 1.6 794 21.8 
1984 5.1 -1.9 635 14.3 
1985 5.6 7.0 673 11.4 
1986 6.2 2.1 719 13.5 
1987 6.7 1.1 754 9.9 
1988 7.8 7.6 851 10.1 
1989 8.3 5.2 873 15.1 
1990 8.8 7.0 897 15.5 
1991 8.2 7.1 810 46.5 
1992 6.7 -8.4 648 46.3 
1993 6.5 2.1 608 18.6 
1994 6.9 5.8 618 21.1 
1995 7.1 0.2 620 25.8 
1996 8.8 9.7 735 16.4 
1997 9.0 1.4 762 20.1 
1998 6.3 0.1 532 46.7 
1999 6.0 -3.6 508 56.9 
2000 5.7 -7.3 489 55.2 
2001 5.7 -2.7 490 112.1 
2002 5.6 -4.4 478 198.9 
2003 5.1 -10.4 433 598.7 
2004 5.0 -3.6 430 132.7 
2005 5.0 -4.0 427 585.8 
2006 4.9 -5.4 417 1,281.1 
2007 4.7 -6.1 403 108,844.1 
2008 3.2 -14.1 < 402 489,000,000,000 
   Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database and IMF (2009) for 2008 figures 
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Also since 1999, GDP per capita, a rough estimate of citizens' social and economic well-
being have been continuously declining from a figure of US$755 at independence to 
figure of below US$402 as of 2008. On the inflation front, annual inflation rate was 
below 10 percent for 16 years after independence. The rates however, lipped into three 
levels since 2001 and enter four-digit in 2006 before settling at 12-digit by end of 2008. 
 
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the country’s multi-faceted meltdown across all its 
economic, political, and social spheres within a period of less than decade that is 2000 to 
2009. Such meltdowns have been akin to countries in civil wars, acute political conflict 
or full-blown war.   
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Figure 1: State fragility - Zimbabwe's economic, political and humanitarian crises: 
2000 – 2009 
 
Source: author compilation 
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1.2 Getting Zimbabwe moving again 
 
The above brief background to the country’s dark ages has motivated the new inclusive 
government to get Zimbabwe rising from its skeletons and start moving again. The new 
government’s recent economic recovery blue print, the STERP (GoZ, 2009: 20) considers 
the following as some of the issues to be addressed to get country rise from its economic, 
social and political quagmire into a new Zimbabwe with hope and future.  
 
i. Social protection measures meant to mitigate poverty and suffering by 
resuscitating public services delivery, as well as strengthening humanitarian 
assistance, particularly focusing on Targeted Vulnerable Groups;  
ii. Support for the revival of productive sectors;  
iii. Creation of a conducive investment climate in the country;  
iv. Establishing a sound macroeconomic environment conducive for stabilization 
through demand side management measures in particular capacity expansion in all 
sectors;  
v. Strengthening the regulatory environment of the financial sector; and  
vi. Finalizing the national employment policy.  
 
 
One of the strategies of the new government of raising the necessary funds to finance the 
above priority areas and others has been to engage the international community, from 
bilateral donors, to countries and to group of countries to mobilize financial package to 
kick start the country’s economic recovery journey. Since February 2009 to the time of 
writing, newspapers across the world are awash with news preaching the begging bowl of 
Zimbabwe. Just few quotations from newspapers testify to this begging agenda. 
 
 
‘The government says it needs $8.5 billion for an economic recovery plan over 
the next two to three years, with $1 billion for budget support and a $1 billion 
credit line’ (Independent Online Newspaper, 3 April 2009). 
 
‘The administration has said its short-term emergency recovery programme 
STERP will require $8.5-billion over the next two to three years. It will depend 
heavily on help from Western donors and Harare wants financial assistance from 
countries in the regional grouping SADC’ (Independent Online Newspaper, 4 
April 2009). 
 
‘The Southern African Development Community is sending a delegation to 
Washington next week to urge the U.S. government, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank to help members of the regional organization fund 
Zimbabwe's economic recovery plan’. (The Zimbabwean Newspaper, 19 April 
2009). 
 
 
 
 8
Even the GoZ’s STERP policy document point to the fact that: 
 
 “Addressing the above priority areas will require huge financial resources in 
excess of US$5 billion as outlined under the section on “Funding of STERP” 
below and underpinned by consistent implementation of respective policies and 
other measures” (GoZ, 2009: 20)  
 
Every rational person submits to the fact that the country is in die need of money for this 
economic rebuilding journey. In all the intensions to revive the economic system, no 
mention was done of engaging and using the country’s own resources. It is therefore the 
intention of this paper to present a different approach (to that of begging for money) to 
the country’s economic recovery agenda. This study argues that the country is currently 
stocked with enough resources which can quickly generates more than US$8.5 billion 
even in less than a year. The only lacking issue is political will to manage the country’s 
valuable resources for the benefit of the country.  
 
The main objective of this study is to present Chiadzwa diamonds as the possible source 
of the money needed for the recovery program. When properly managed and with all 
corruption removed, Chiadzwa diamonds can provide at least US$1 billion per month and 
in 8 months; the US$8.5 billion can be accumulated. This option will also have the 
following advantages, among others: the country will not incur or accumulate any debt, 
there will be no strings attached, there will be no conditions (as the case with donor 
funds), the country will be free to use the revenues according to its prioritised projects 
and the country will not be a nation to be laughed at by other countries.   
 
 
2 Brief background to Chaidzwa diamonds 
 
Whilst this section will attempt to give relevant details about Chiadzwa diamonds, it 
should however be noted that currently there are no scholastic references on Chiadzwa 
diamonds, this study being the first article to the best knowledge of the author. The 
information on these diamonds is currently in bits and pieces and scattered in daily 
newspapers across the globe. It is also important to note that since the discovery of 
diamonds and until the time of writing, the area has become a sacred, with heavily Iraq-
equivalent strong army having deployed to fully guide the area since November 2007. 
Even genuine native people who are currently staying in other parts of the country or 
cities such as Harare, are required by ‘law’ to have visa rekuenda kumusha kuChiadzwa 
kwa Marange (traveling visa to go to their native home in Chiadzwa area of Marange) to 
visit their relatives and friends or even to attend funerals. Also the Chiadzwa diamonds 
fields are currently political to such an extent that very little information is provided to 
fellow citizens regarding their national and common resource. To this end, only 
information which is general and relevant for the objective of this study will be briefly 
presented.  
 
The 170 acre Chiadzwa diamond fields are situated in the Chiadzwa and Charasike areas 
of Marange District, about 60 kilometers southwest of Mutare. The area is also located on 
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the border with Mozambique. Whilst discovery of diamonds in this area (comprising 
Chiadzwa and Chirasike) is not exactly known, it is however believed that the diamonds 
were discovered in September 2006. The estimated Chiadzwa diamond resources are 
currently believed to be around 16.5 million tones according to Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ).  
 
Although before the discovery, the Chiadzwa and Marange areas were not known at all, 
nor did geographers bothered to find them a place on the map of Zimbabwe, after the 
discovery, the name Marange has become an international name, especially in the 
diamond arena. In fact, Hove (2009) allude to the fact that Marange and Chiadzwa are 
now international destinations, with diverse “tourists” and visitors including Israelis, 
Lebanese, Belgians, Afrikaners, Japanese, Americans, national political heavyweights 
and businessmen. According to Hove (2009), all sorts of diamond gladiators who sniff 
the air for wealth have been seen visiting the once-neglected Chiadzwa, Marange. 
Because of stringent regulations required for one to visiting the area, some diamond 
smugglers and crooks (both local and foreigners) are know to have been seeking 
marriageable girls of Chiadzwa.  
 
In terms of ownership, reports say that the Chiadzwa diamond fields were owned by a 
British company, Africa Consolidated Resources (ACR) which had mining concession 
(rights) for the area as well as exploration contract. The company argues that it was 
through its exploration which led to the discovery of the deposits of industrial diamonds 
in Chiadzwa (The Zimbabwean Newspaper, 5 April, 2009). Nevertheless, the company 
indicates that the government cancelled the mining concession in December 2007 as the 
government argued that the ‘license could have been issued in error’(New Zimbabwe 
Online Newspaper, 12 February 2008). Beginning 2009, the state-run Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corporation (ZMDC) has since taken over mining operations at the 
diamond fields. Latest reports to the mining activities of ZMDC as of March 2009 
indicates that the parastatal was only realizing between 50 000 to 60 000 carats of 
diamonds a week, with a daily diamond output of US$600 000 (The Zimbabwean 
Newspaper, 5 April, 2009). 
 
Since the discovery of these diamonds until today (2009), more than 99.9 percent or all 
Chiadzwa diamond revenues have been pocketed by individual politicians2, moguls, 
barons and business tycoons without any revenue going to the state or government 
coffers. According to one source, whilst the official plan since the discovery of diamonds 
in 2006 was for the then government to mine at Marange, unfortunately and without any 
need to account to anyone, government left mining of Chiadzwa diamonds for the benefit 
of senior government and Zanu (PF) officials and those close to them, with little income 
returned to the government (The Zimbabwean Newspaper, 5 April, 2009). According to 
one minister, even the government’s own employees deployed to ‘guard’ the Chiadzwa 
diamonds, the police and soldiers, whose official conduct is guided by command are 
refusing to be transferred:  
 
                                                 
2 High ranking politicians and officials from ZANU-PF political party are among the most notorious 
diamond benefactors. 
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‘Most security forces members    deployed   at Chiadzwa   are now refusing to be   
transferred   from   the diamond fields   some have even   threatened   to   take my 
ministry   to court. The    reason why  they  don’t want  to  leave   the  place  is  
because   there  are    involved    in    corrupt   activities. There are looting 
diamonds   which   there are selling to   foreigners from South Africa and Nigeria’ 
(The Zimbabwean Newspaper 22 March 2009).   
 
Generally, Zimbabwe government’s mode of diamond mining has been deplored as 
“haphazard” by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Internationally, mining of 
Chiadzwa diamonds has quickly attracted the attention of the United Nations (UN) 
Kimberley Process (KP) which normally monitor the trade in so-called “blood diamonds” 
and this organization has visited the area twice since diamond discovery, both in 2006 
and in March 2009. This body’s two visits within a short interval have been prompted by 
reported mass killings of ‘illegal’ diamond diggers in the area. Another global diamond 
certification body, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFBD) has ordered a ban 
on trade in diamonds from Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa diamonds over concerns about human 
rights violations (The Independent Online Newspaper, South Africa, 3 April 2009). 
 
Thus, this paper argues that if the current government can take control of Chiadzwa 
diamonds and run it for the benefit of the majority, then its economic recovery can be at 
any accelerated rate and without any need at all for continuing with its current financial 
begging gospel.   
 
3 Financial potential of Chiadzwa diamonds 
 
Currently there are two figures circulating pertaining the potential financial revenue 
which can be grossed by the state after diamond sales. The RBZ estimates that Chiadzwa 
diamonds ‘should provide over US$1 billion per month in revenue’(Roger, 2008), while 
another source laments ‘that lack of proper institutional, orderly and legal framework for 
diamond miners has results in the country loosing at least US$1, 2 billion per month’ 
(Unknow). Although some analysts consider these monthly diamond revenue sales from 
Chiadzwa diamonds as conservative, simple calculus means that, if Chiadzwa diamonds 
is properly managed for the benefit of the country and without any corruption activities as 
is the case currently, the country will be able to get at least US$12 billion per year. This 
figure from diamond alone will be greater than any previous GDP figures for Zimbabwe 
even during good years of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Thus, if there is political will to stop corruption and manage the diamond properly, even 
starting June 2009, the country will be able to get at least 70 percent of the US$8.3 billion 
it is begging for its economic recovery programme. So why not use Chiadzwa diamonds 
and stop begging. Unlike begging, Chiadzwa will be advantageous in that, there will be 
no strings attached, freedom to use the money on the country’s prioritized recovery 
projects, no incurring debts which will become burdensome for future generation, 
creation of employment in the mining of the diamond, and lastly, the country will not be 
a laughing symbol.    
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Table 2 and corresponding Figure A1 and Figure A2 in Appendix, presents projections of 
the effect of Chaidzwa diamond revenues on the country’s GDP and GDP per capita 
using 2007 as the base year. Whilst diamonds were discovered late 2006, the assumption 
is that if there was any political will on the part of the then government to harness this 
valuable resource for the benefit of the country, the state should have started collecting 
meaningful diamond revenues beginning 2007. The scenario projections are partial 
statistical simulation and do not show economy-wide impacts which can only be shown 
using techniques such as economic general equilibrium (CGE) modeling. Thus, these 
projects are the minimal potential GDP direct impacts of Chiadzwa diamond revenue. In 
other words, the benefits from this diamond field, if properly managed for the benefit of 
the whole country, will be by far greater than what is presented in Table 2.  
 
As alluded before, given that two different revenue figures, that is US$1 billion and 
US$1.2 billion, have been estimated to be the potential monthly revenue sales from 
Chiadzwa diamonds, the projections in this section incorporates these two figures 
separately. Thus, US$ 12 billion (= US$1 billion x 12) and US$14.4 billion (=US$1.2b x 
12) are added to each of the projected years’ potential GDP figures. Case 1 refers to a 
situation were both growth rates for GDP and population are assumed to remain constant, 
while case 2, which is a much more realistic situation where growth rates for the above 
mentioned two variables are assumed to be changing.  
 
As indicated in the table, in the situation where GDP and population levels are assumed 
to remain as there were in 2007, the country’s GDP and per capita income will remain the 
same at US$4.7 billion and US$401 even until 2015 in the case where diamond activities 
and sales revenue are not harnessed for the benefit of the country. However, if the new 
government decides to properly manage and mine the Chiadzwa diamond for the 
development of the country, without any sales revenue leakages, then the country’s GDP 
and per capita income could be US$16.7 billion and US$1 423 if one uses diamond 
revenue estimates of US$12 per year. These projections could be even higher, amounting 
to US$19.1 billion and US$1 628, respectively and annually since 2008 to 2015. If there 
was political will to utilize this valuable resource for the betterment of the country, these 
diamond augmented figures might have started in 2007.  
 
Thus, even assuming this unrealistic assumption of zero growth in GDP in 2009, if the 
new government decides to manage and harness Chiadzwa diamond properly, then there 
will be no need to continue with the begging bowl, looking for financial aid to kick-start 
the country’s economic and developmental agenda. Sales from Chaidzwa diamond will 
be MORE THAN ENOUGH. In fact there will be an added advantage of that, rather than 
having the money in trenches of say US$2 billion in 2009 and other trenches the 
following years as has been suggested by Zimbabwe’s finance ministry during the 
fundraising tour, the country can have more than US$8.3 billion which it seeks in just one 
year and not in more than three years. Even standards of living, judging by per capita 
income for Zimbabwe will lip-frog from US$401 to more than US$1 423.  
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Table 2: Zimbabwe’s nine-year scenario with Chiadzwa Diamond Revenues 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Case 1: No changes in GDP and population 
GDP figures 
GDP (US$ billions) (No 
Diamond Rev) 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 
GDP + Diamond extra US$12 
billion Revenue 16.70 16.70 16.70 16.70 16.70 16.70 16.70 16.70 16.70 
GDP + Diamond extra US$14.4 
billion Revenue 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10 
Per Capita Income figures 
Per capita (US$) (No Diamond 
Revenue) 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 
Per capital income (US$) (with 
extra US$12 billion) 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 
Per capital income (US$) 
(with extra US$12 billion) 1,628 1,628 1,628 1,628 1,628 1,628 1,628 1,628 1,628 
Population (millions) 11.73 11.73 11.73 11.73 11.73 11.73 11.73 11.73 11.73 
Case 2: Growth changes in GDP and population 
GDP figures 
GDP % change -6.1 -14.1 9 8 8.5 7.5 6.5 6 6.2 
GDP (No Diamond revenue) 4.70 4.75 5.17 5.59 6.06 6.52 6.94 7.36 7.81 
GDP + Diamond extra US$12 
billion Revenue 16.70 16.75 17.17 17.59 18.06 18.52 18.94 19.36 19.81 
GDP Diamond extra US$14.4 
billion Revenue 19.10 19.15 19.57 19.99 20.46 20.92 21.34 21.76 22.21 
Per Capita Income figures 
Per capital income (No 
diamond revenue) 401 425 461 495 534 572 606 639 675 
Per capital income (US(US$) 
(with extra US$12 billion) 1,427 1,457 1,484 1,517 1,547 1,575 1,601 1,631 1,423 
Per capital income (US$) (US$) 
(with extra US$12 billion) 1,632 1,660 1,687 1,718 1,748 1,774 1,800 1,829 1,628 
Population (0.5 % growth from 
2009) 11.73 11.73 11.79 11.85 11.91 11.97 12.03 12.09 12.15 
Source: author projections 
 
The realistic case 2 where both GDP3 and population are assumed to grow during the 
projected time period shows even more promising and better figures. If Chiadzwa 
diamond revenue sales are managed for the benefit of the country, tabulated figures 
indicates that GDP figures will grow from US$17.2 billion in 2009 to around US$19.8 
billion by 2015 when one assumes that the country gets US$12 billion annually (or US$1 
billion per month) from Chiadzwa diamond sales. Otherwise, these figures will be 
US$19.6 billion and US$22.2 billion, respectively, if the country manages to sale 
US$14.4 billion worth of Chiadzwa carats, annually. Corresponding growth will be 
                                                 
3 The GDP growth rates are assumed mirroring the rates which the country achieved in 
the years soon after independence in 1980 (as presented in Table 1. 
 13
witnessed in GDP per capita, rising from US$401 to US$1 423 (when US$12 billion 
diamond revenue is added) and to even higher figure of US$1 628 (when US$14.4 billion 
diamond revenue is added 
 
Thus, either Chiadzwa diamond sales, amounts to US$12 billion or US$14.4 billion 
annually when the field is fully managed by the state and for national benefit, the fact 
remains the that country this valuable resource endowment presents the best self-
sufficient economic recovery route for Zimbabwe. Given the above projections, this 
strongly paper argues that there is no need for Zimbabwe to continue running around 
either in southern Africa region or around the world with its financial begging bowl 
preaching the gospel of seeking funds to kick start the country’s economic recovery 
journey when the country is resourced with valuable Chiadzwa diamonds, which are 
currently benefiting few politicians, among other elites.      
 
 
4 Policy suggestion on how best Zimbabwe can manage Chiadzwa diamond 
 
 
This section briefly presents some few management issues which Zimbabwe’s new 
government, the GNU; need to consider should it decide to harness the diamond field for 
the betterment and sustainability of Zimbabwe’s future economic growth and 
development. The main objective of this section is to for-warn the GoZ and avoid what 
Kaunda once lamented: 
 
‘We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in 
our mouths’(Keneth Kaunda, former President of Zambia, Quoted in Sarraf and 
Jiwanji, 2001) 
 
But rather, the study desires a situation where: 
 
‘Natural resource wealth, properly managed, can provide enormous benefits. 
Mismanaged or abused, it can also accompany untold suffering’. (The 13th 
International Anti-Corruption Conference Newspaper, 1st November 2008, Issue, 
03). 
 
It is however important to note that these management frameworks presented in this 
section are not exhaustive, neither are they exclusive, but rather they can be fused 
together in one way or another. Further, it should also be emphasized that there is no 
‘one-size-fit-all’ management style when it comes to the successful management of 
natural resources. Literature on management of diamond mining implicitly dichotomizes 
the management of the mineral into two categories. The first category involves 
management of issues surrounding ownership, actual mining and selling of the mineral 
proceeds (for instance, selling of carats in the case of diamond mineral). The second 
category deals with management of the use of the revenue or sales proceeds from the 
mineral (carat) sales.  
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In these two categories, both recently experimented as well as established management 
frameworks will be presented. In the latter category, much reliance will be from 
Botswana’s established framework given that most authors identifies it as the only 
African country to be an exception to the general pattern of poor economic performance 
in diamond rich economies (Poteete, 2009; and Auty et al, 1999) such as those witnessed 
in diamond endowed countries such as DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia. According to 
Poteete (2009), Botswana’s success when compared, not only to diamond or mineral rich 
countries, but even to oil countries rich countries is evidenced in the following four 
things: (i) the relative stability of its real exchange rate; (ii) its accumulation of foreign 
reserves; (c) a relatively balanced pattern of growth; and (iv) the survival of its multiparty 
electoral system.  
 
 
4.1 Management of ownership, mining and selling of diamonds 
 
4.1.1 Botswana’s case 
 
Botswana’s diamond mining is owned and/or controlled by Debswana Diamond 
Company Limited which is a 50/50 joint venture between the government of Botswana 
and DeBeers Centenary AG (Coakley, 2004). Rather than leaving the control and mining 
of diamond to private entities, the country decided to have a stake in the mineral. Thus, 
because of this ownership and control arrangement, the country has manage to formulate 
its budgets year after year with guarantee that whatever its diamond revenues projects 
will be, it will be able to have enough control. The marketing of Botswana diamonds is 
strictly monitored and is done through the De Beers Diamond Trading Company 
(formerly the Central Selling Organization) located in the United Kingdom (UK). Thus, 
in the Botswana diamond industry, no individual have a diamond claim, and it is even a 
crime according to the country’s laws for an individual to be found in possession of 
diamonds. These enforced rules have helped the country to fully enjoy proceeds from 
diamond sales for the benefit of the country and not individuals, as the current case with 
Zimbabwe’s chiadzwa diamonds.  
 
Botswana’s diamond management is thus exclusively under government control. The 
country’s management style under this category is in sharp contrast to other styles 
exhibited in such countries as DRC and Liberian, were the term “blood diamond” has 
often been used to described diamonds from such countries as these diamond has fuelled 
civil wars, causing numerous deaths in these nations. It is however unfortunate that 
Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa diamonds at the time of writing has been described as ‘blood 
diamonds’. Nevertheless, once there is political will to manage the field, this can be 
swiftly reversed.    
 
 
4.1.2 Integrated Diamond Management Program (IDPM) 
 
In an attempt to bring Sierra Leone diamonds from ‘blood diamond’ category into the 
legal system, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) invented 
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and experimented with IDPM on the former country’s diamond industry. IDPM was 
designed to take account of the fact that, Sierra Leone diamond industry, unlike 
Botswana, is ‘considered as one large mine with the exporters as the owners’ (Even-
Zohar, 2003). Since the implementation of IDPM framework, USAID (2005) claim that 
the management framework has been working quite well for Sierra Leone given that 
‘considerable progress has been made in bringing the more diamonds into the legal 
system, while increasing the value of diamonds exported’ (USAID (2005: iv).   
 
Figure 2 presents a possible management framework that Zimbabwe can adopt, wholly or 
partly, for management of Chiadzwa diamond. The framework has five major 
management components. 
 
1) Improved GoZ diamond management systems 
 
There is serious and argent need for the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to make 
concrete policy changes to enable diamond management, especially with partners 
such as the Kimberly Process (KP) and the international community. In light of 
the current and existing corrupt and looting of Chiadzwa diamond sales as of 
today; this may require even vigorous international pressure to ensure that 
significant changes can be implemented in a sustainable manner. Such changes 
will have the potential to reduce corruption, and smuggling of diamonds. Thus, 
the Ministry of Mines or other relevant statutory board has the duty to ensure that 
standards are set with respect to: 
 
§ Rational (Chiadzwa diamond) mining investment rules 
§ Transparent business transaction records 
§ The onus of “know your customer” being placed on diamond dealers and 
exporters 
§ Ensuring accountability for the above. 
 
2) Active civil society supporting improved public and private diamond management 
 
There is also need to involve civil society organizations in supporting and/or 
monitoring both public and private diamond management. Given that most civil 
societies are composed of enlightened members ranging from lawyers, political 
activists etc, they have the capacity to diffuse and bring to light any corruption 
and mismanagement which may happen in the diamond industry. Their 
involvement in a country like Zimbabwe is even paramount given a long history 
of corruption in the country’s management, not only of mining activities, but also 
across a number of sectors.  
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Figure 2: Chiadzwa Diamond’s Integrated Diamond Management Program 
(CDIDPM)  
 
Source: Constructed using USAID’s (2005) IDPM framework 
 
 
3) Involvement of private sector diamond businesses 
 
This framework considers involvement of private sector businesses in diamond 
industry. In the case where government decides to involve private sector, then 
such businesses should be transparent, competitive and responsive to community 
interests. This implies that the new GoZ should shun and immediately do away 
with involving private sector  controlled by few politicians as is currently the case 
with most mining activities in gold, platinum etc where politicians and their 
relatives from the former ruling ZANU-PF political party controls most, in not all, 
private entities in the mining sector.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                        Expected Results 
i) Increased diamond exports & sales revenue 
ii) Increased benefits to the majority 
Zimbabweans from diamond mining 
Strategic Objective:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          1. Improved GoZ            2. Active civil                 3. Private sector               4. Improved 
           diamond mgt systems     society supporting         diamond businesses         community 
           and incentives to use       improved public            that are more                    diamond 
            them effectively            and private diamond       transparent,                      management 
                                                   management                  competitive, and               systems and  
                                                                                          responsive to                    incentives to use 
                                                                                          community interests.         Them effectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Improved enabling environment for diamond management 
Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa diamond 
trade contributes positively to 
economic recovery and sustainable 
development 
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4) Improved community management systems and incentive to use them effectively 
 
This concept is premised on the principle of internal self–monitoring with strict 
procedures4 and external oversight.  Given that the objective of this whole 
management framework will be to convert Chiadzwa diamond resource from a 
source of corruption and ‘blood diamond’ to a foundation of economic recovery 
and sustainable development, this section should ensure that management of 
Chiadzwa diamond can: 
 
§ Have a transparent, fair, and safe local or international market 
§ Maximize benefits of local miners, diggers, and their communities and the 
country at large 
§ Track diamonds from earth to export 
§ Minimize corruption 
§ Mobilize local surveillance and monitoring 
 
 
5) Improved enabling environment for improved diamond management  
 
GoZ will need to ensure that that its Chiadzwa diamond production processes are 
brought in line with the Kimberley Process so as to ensure that the country’s 
diamond industry meets the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
 
Overall, given the above two frameworks, the study suggest the first (Botswana) 
framework as the possible best option for Zimbabwe’s particular situation. This will, 
however, work successfully when the new government decides to take control of the 
country’s diamond fields. 
 
 
4.2 Management of the use of diamond revenues  
 
‘We have prudently used the revenues from diamonds to build a modern nation 
and a vibrant economy’. (Former President Mogae of Botswana, 7th June 2006, 
available at: www.diamondfacts.org) 
 
 
‘There can be no doubt that diamonds have played a major part in the 
transformation of our country’s fortunes and the lives of our citizens…Revenue 
from diamonds has enabled Government to fund virtually 100% of basic 
education, provide virtually free healthcare, build infrastructure that has supported 
our economic activity and to fund 80% of the anti-retroviral drugs that have give 
                                                 
4 Zimbabwe is not new to this system of internal monitoring as it has a well-established similar program in 
management of wild animals, called Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) which has been successful as the communities have significantly monitored animal poaching 
in their respective areas. 
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hope to our fellow citizens living with HIV/AIDS’ (Former President Mogae of 
Botswana, 13th November 2006, available at: www.diamondfacts.org) 
 
Poteete (2009), Makochekanwa (2009), Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) and Transparency 
International (undated) are among the various authors who have praised Botswana as one 
of the countries which has avoided a number of the usual pitfalls that bedevil resource 
boom countries. Thus, the country has successfully managed the diamond mineral boom. 
Botswana’s success was (is) however premised on the design, existence and effective 
implementation of a barrage or arsenal of both prudent monetary and fiscal policies 
which were (are) tailor-made to specifically deal with revenue proceeds from the 
diamond industry. This section is therefore modeled along Botswana’s proven diamond 
revenue use framework which has been practically implemented and has had very 
successful results which cannot be disputed by any analysts.  
 
1. Control over expenditures 
 
Botswana managed over the years to save a large fraction of revenues, avoided 
excessive increases in expenditure, and sustained high recurrent surpluses. Over 
the years the government of Botswana (GoB) decided not to increase spending 
whenever revenue increased. Rather, the country based its expenditure levels on 
longer-term expectations of export earnings and government revenues. Thus, even 
during 1981/82 and 1994 when there were falls in diamond export earnings, 
surpluses declined while expenditure levels were maintained (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 
2001). In recent months, since the start of the current financial global crisis (in 
2008), the country has managed to avoid drastic cuts in expenditures when 
revenues decreased. This ability to maintain expenditures has ensured that the 
country’s long term growth had been reinforced.  
 
2. Building of foreign exchange reserves 
 
As alluded to above, GoB avoided increasing spending whenever diamond 
revenue increased. The country refused the temptation to spend everything in the 
treasury and instead, any excess revenue was used to build up foreign exchange 
reserves at the Bank of Botswana. These reserves were thus available to be used 
mostly in years when revenues were low. The country managed to maintain 
average reserves which covered more than 20 months worth of imports for the 
larger part of the time period since diamonds were discovered. The import cover 
even peaked in 2005 when they reached 40 months (Poteete, 2009) and the 
country’s international reserve import cover was 28 months as of April 2009.  
 
3. Avoidance of external debt 
 
Botswana has managed to avoid external debt since it started mining the diamond 
more than 30 years ago. Even faced with the current global financial crisis which 
has paralyzed countries across the globe, from big and rich countries such as USA 
to small and poor countries of Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), Botswana is not 
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considering borrowing any money. Rather, the country is considering utilizing its 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves.  
 
 
 
4. Encouragement of economic diversification  
 
The country has been implementing product diversification over the year after 
realizing that relying on one export commodity can be disastrous. Whilst the share 
of manufacturing value added in GDP is small, accounting for slightly above 4 
percent in 2006, its growth has been very dynamic, especially when compared to 
the average growth of the manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan African countries 
or upper-middle income economies. The country’s growth of the service sector (in 
its broadest definition) has resulted in this sector contributing more than 30 
percent of the country’s GDP, slightly below mining’s 36 percent. 
  
 
5. Domestic investment strategy  
 
The optimal investment strategy for resource endowed countries is that the 
country should not invest beyond its absorptive capacity, but rather should 
consider all the recurrent costs associated with new investment programs and only 
invest when the expected rate of return is considerably above that which can be 
earned in risk-less foreign assets. In fact others propose that it is better to leave 
windfall gains in the hands of the private sector (Collier and Gunning 1996 in 
McMahon, 1997:38) while some scholars support the notion of pursuing 
investments with high social rates of return, particularly those in human capital 
and infrastructure (Seymour 2000). In the case of Botswana, given high level of 
savings emanating from diamond revenues surpluses, the country had to decide 
the proportions of surpluses to be allocated between domestic investment and 
accumulation of international reserves.  
 
Botswana’s domestic investments were based on expected intermediate and long 
term revenue flow, after taking account of the recurrent expenditure involved in 
each new development project. The country’s prudent domestic investment 
strategy was designed in such a way as to avoid mistakes that most countries 
engage themselves once faced with a boom. According to McMahon (1997), most 
countries faced with resource boom often make irreversible government 
investment expenditure decisions without proper account of the recurrent 
expenditures associated with each new investment. As a result, once the boom is 
over and the revenue streams subsided, it becomes very difficult to adjust 
expenditures down to be at par with the new smaller revenues, and projects often 
have to be abandoned before completion. A case in point is Trinidad and Tobago 
where there was public pressure to share the benefits of the boom, which led to 
large subsidies for food, fuel, utilities, and loss-making enterprises. However, 
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when the annual growth rate of GDP was actually negative in 1981, there was 
considerable political difficulty in making cutbacks (McMahon 1997). 
 
In the case of Botswana, the government religiously and judiciously avoided 
undertaking any new development projects if there was no provision to cover the 
long term recurrent costs. In fact, GoB has consistently produced National 
Development Plans (NDP) which outlined its spending and according to the 
country’s laws, once a plan was voted into force by parliament, it became illegal 
to implement any additional public projects without going back to parliament. 
Thus, because of this system, the country managed to effectively control its 
spending over the years and avoided the inception of a project for which no 
provision was made to cover the total costs over time (Sarraf and Jiwani, 2001). 
 
6. No room for rent seekers  
 
Rent-seekers, both within and outside of the public sector can influence 
implementation of inappropriate economic management whose effects are 
detrimental to the whole economy. Auty (1998) point out that existence of large 
resource rents can distract attention away from long-term economic development 
goals and towards rent seeking activity and patronage. Lane and Tornell (1995) 
further argue that a resource boom can lead to a “feeding frenzy” in which rent 
seekers fight for the natural resource rents. In the case of Botswana, the country 
has not allowed any room for maneuvers by rent seekers. Zimbabwe’s mining 
industry is currently characterized by strong rent-seekers and most of them are 
either politicians or their relatives, even in the current setting of Chiadzwa 
diamond. Thus for any successful benefits to be extracted from Zimbabwe’s 
Chiadzwa diamond field, the room for rent seekers should therefore be closed 
permanently.   
 
 
7. Management of exchange rate  
 
GoB has over the years intervened whenever necessary in the management of its 
foreign exchange rates. The country’s management of Pula exchange versus 
currencies such as the US dollar and South African rand, among other currencies, 
has afforded the country to avoid real appreciation of the local currency, thus 
ensuring continued competitiveness of the country’s non-diamond exports. The 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves during boom periods which was 
refereed before was therefore consistent with this exchange rate management 
objective. Thus Botswana avoided a common problem of local currency 
appreciation which most countries experiences during export booms whose 
negative effect leads to a reduction in the competitiveness of other export 
products. 
 
Overall, the study recommend Zimbabwe’s new government, the GNU, to seriously 
consider the management style of diamond industry which has bee implemented by 
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Botswana over the years. Whilst, it may not be possible to replicate the whole 
management style, the GNU can at least borrow a lot of good advice from Botswana. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The research was motivated by the need for Zimbabwe’s recovery financial assistance to 
kick-start the recovery of its economy. Since the formation of the government of national 
unity (GNU) on February 2009, the GNU had been on a begging mission, mostly within 
the southern Africa region, with its begging bowl, preaching the gospel of financial 
assistance to the tune of at least US$8.3 billion, with US$2 billion required immediately.  
 
The study presented the potential financial ability of Chiadzwa diamond revenue sales in 
contributing towards the country’s economic recovery and future sustainable economic 
growth and development. Using the two estimated monthly revenue sales of US$1 billion 
and US$1.2 billion from Chiadzwa diamond, the study argues that the country’s 
immediate financial requirements of at least US$8.3 billion can be wholly met with 
proceeds from this mine field, only if the new unity government has a political will. 
Partial projections presented in this paper shows that, once diamond revenue sales are 
harnessed by the government for the benefit of the whole economy as opposed to the 
current situation where the few revenues are only benefiting few politicians and their 
relatives, the country’s GDP can jump from the 2008 level of US$3.2 billion to at least 
US$16.7 billion starting 2009. Thus this study concludes that there is no need for 
Zimbabwe to continue begging for this small amount of US$8.3 billion given that the 
country has Chiadzwa diamond whose sales revenues can bring that amount in less than a 
year, ONLY if the GNU has political will to ensure that the national resources are used 
for the benefit of the whole country. 
 
The paper ended by suggesting management frameworks that the GoZ can consider 
implementing in the management of Chiadzwa diamond. The management framework 
was divided into two: management dealing with ownership, mining and sale of diamonds; 
and management relating to the use of diamond revenues. In both frameworks, the study 
borrowed heavily from the proven and pragmatic management style of Botswana, the 
only African country to successfully manage diamonds for the betterment of its economy.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 Figure A1: GDP projections with and without diamond revenue 
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Key:  
GDP1 = No changes in GDP and population growths, and no diamond revenue 
GDP2 = No changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$12b diamond revenue 
GDP3 = No changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$14.4b diamond revenue 
GDP4 = Changes in GDP and population growths and no diamond revenue 
GDP5 = Changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$12b diamond revenue 
GDP3 = Changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$14.4b diamond revenue 
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Figure A2: GDP per capita projections with and without diamond revenue 
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Key:  
CI = Per Capita Income (of GDP) 
CI1 = No changes in GDP and population growths, and no diamond revenue 
CP2 = Changes in GDP and population growths and no diamond revenue 
CI3 = No changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$12b diamond revenue 
CI4 = No changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$14.4b diamond revenue  
CI5 = Changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$12b diamond revenue 
CI6 = Changes in GDP and population growths, plus US$14.4b diamond revenue 
 
 
 
